If you ask many engaged couples what’s worrying them before the big day, you’ll probably hear about things like catering budgets, guest lists, or finding the right dress.

But for thousands of working-class people in Ģ����Ƶ and across the country, something else is causing their wedding anxiety: the financial benefits they might lose.

Because of rules in our tax system, walking down the aisle can sometimes lead to what’s called a “marriage penalty.” Instead of helping couples build a stable foundation, current policies often force a heartbreaking choice: commit to each other legally, or make ends meet.

The Cost of Combining Incomes

The is one of our country’s largest anti-poverty initiatives. The credit increases with every dollar workers make, up to a point, and then phases out as a household earns more.

But the EITC can also be a hidden poverty trap. When low-income people get married, the tax system unintentionally penalizes them for doing exactly what they should to escape poverty: working hard, combining resources, and building a stable home. 

Imagine two parents who want to marry each other. The woman makes $18,000 per year, and the man makes $30,000 per year.

As a single head of household tax filer with two kids, the woman qualifies for a much-needed $7,200 tax credit.

Her partner files single and doesn’t qualify for the EITC.

Together, unmarried, they use the $7,200 credit the woman gets at tax time to pay debts or cover expenses.

But if they marry, the tax system starts phasing out their credit based on their new $48,000 joint income, and it instantly drops to about $3,770.

The new spouses lose $3,430 overnight—almost a full month’s income—just because they made their relationship official. 

For some, this can be too much of a loss to risk.

The Life-Changing Power of Marriage and Family Stability

Marriage can lead to more happiness and satisfaction for couples—two incomes to cover the bills, a partner who shares the responsibilities, and the sense of well-being that comes from experiencing life with someone you love.

And kids who grow up in stable, two-parent homes are more likely to thrive in school, have better physical and mental health, and break cycles of generational poverty. 

But many low-income families aren’t getting to experience these benefits, and policies that discourage marriage—like the ones involving the EITC—are part of the reason why. 

Statistics confirm a decrease in marriages but also their importance for families.

• Just 50% of American adults are currently married, down from 69% in 1970. The number is even lower for people with less education and those who don’t identify as White.
• 63% of children live with two married parents. Again, that number drops for less-educated and non-White Americans.
• When married parents are compared to single parents with the same level of education, the poverty rate for a married person is 75% lower.
• Children raised by married parents are 82% less likely to live in poverty.

When it comes to Ģ����Ƶ:

• 54% of women and 49% of men are unmarried.
• 38% of children live in single-parent families.
• 18% of children (461,000 kids) live in poverty—the fifth highest number in the country.
• The state ranks 39th in the nation for overall child and family well-being.

Big cultural shifts have changed how many people think about marriage—and this plays a role in decisions not to marry. But the data shows that a stable, two-parent home still provides families with more financial security and opportunities for upward mobility. It’s also one of the most powerful solutions for lifting children out of poverty.

A Less Risky Path to “I Do”

A new study from the Ģ����Ƶ Center for Opportunity offers recommendations to make the EITC work better for low-income families. In particular, the federal government could adjust the maximum benefits and the eligibility limit for married couples. This would let new spouses combine their earnings without triggering an automatic loss of some or all of the credit. It would also remove a big barrier to building strong relationships and stable households.

Reforming the EITC won’t solve every challenge facing working-class families. But by restructuring the credit to reward partnership instead of penalizing it, the government can make sure that saying “I do” really is a celebration—a step toward a brighter future and a better quality of life for everyone in the family.

FAQs Ģ����Ƶ the EITC

Additional Resources

The post When a Love Story Meets the Tax Code appeared first on For Opportunity.

Remove Safety-Net Programs from the U.S. Tax Code

Of the federal and state agencies that run more than  intended to help low-income individuals and families, perhaps the worst administrator is the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that runs several safety-net programs, including the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) that provided $.

While many policymakers view the income tax system as an efficient way to dispense safety-net benefits, IRS performance leaves much to be desired.  A recent Wall Street Journal  listed the EITC with the second-highest improper payment rate—more than five times the average improper payment rate. The Journal’s article did not reveal anything new. The IRS also runs the program with the highest improper payment rate, the American Opportunity Tax Credit.

When it comes to marriage penalties, the income tax structure is a bad fit for distributing money to needy households. While there are tax filing statuses for married couples, heads of household, and single individuals, there is no option for unmarried couples. Consider an unmarried couple with two children. One partner can claim both children as head of household while the other files as a single person. Or they can split the children as heads of household. Either way, they will be treated differently than if they were married. 

Congress could create a new tax filing status to accommodate unmarried couples. However, it may be more trouble than it is worth. Unmarried couples run the gamut in financial and relational commitments, and using tax law to address the various situations is complicated and may be perceived as too intrusive for those who just want to pay their tax liability.

Besides, the IRS is set up for annual returns and refunds, not monthly payments. EITC recipients must wait until the following tax year for their benefits. Monthly payments would give assistance when needed, allow families to properly budget, and would be a more effective way to encourage employment, one of the goals of the program. 

The EITC had an advance payment feature that was repealed in 2010 due to . The system relied on employers making the monthly payments to their employees and then being reimbursed by the IRS, but the Government Accountability Office  IRS procedures to be ineffective with noncompliance rates of 80 percent. Although repealing the advance payment feature eliminated this extreme noncompliance rate, the IRS continues to struggle with taxpayer noncompliance with the EITC program.

Make Income Taxes Neutral to Marital Status

Removing safety-net programs from the tax system would allow Congress to focus on making the income tax marital status neutral. In 2017, Congress was successful in  for single individuals who want to marry, provided they have no children and do not qualify for refundable tax credits.

However, marriage penalties remain for the rest of tax filers. For example, suppose a mom earns $20,000, a dad earns $30,000, and they have two children. Table 1 shows the simple tax liability before tax credits for tax year 2025 assuming that, as an unmarried couple, each parent claims one child and the standard deduction. The tax liability before tax credits is $750 if they live together unmarried but $2,000 if they are married, which means a marriage penalty of $1,250.  Even if one parent claims both children, there would still be a penalty.

The example in Table 1 is just one wage combination for a couple with two children. The Ģ����Ƶ Center for Opportunity ran 40,401 wage combinations for this couple if each partner claims one child on their taxes and found that 81% had a marriage penalty. The figure below shows the distribution of the penalties (in red), neutral outcomes (in gray), and the bonuses (in blue). 

One option Congress might consider to eliminate income tax marriage penalties is the flat tax, which treats all taxpayers the same regardless of marital status. The reason can be easily shown using mathematics because the flat tax follows the distributive law of multiplication (see for more). 

Conclusion

The U.S. Tax Code is ill-suited for running safety-net programs without marriage penalties. Furthermore, the IRS has an awful record of improper payments and noncompliance when it comes to running its safety-net programs. Therefore, an important step to eliminate marriage penalties is to take those programs away from the IRS and give them to an agency that knows how to run safety-net programs.

 for an explanation of how these other agencies can eliminate all marriage penalties in safety-net programs.

Image Credits: Canva, Ģ����Ƶ Center for Opportunity

The post It’s Time to Eliminate Marriage Penalties in the U.S. Tax Code appeared first on For Opportunity.

Key Points

• Childhood poverty leads to worse educational attainment, worse future labor market outcomes, worse mental and physical health and development, and increased risk of engaging in delinquent behavior.
• ��A reduction in child poverty is tied to government programs which incentivize work.��
• The key takeaway from the Census data which shows child poverty rates are falling and the Child Trends report which studied the causes of the decline is that, despite massive social safety net expansions, work and self-sustainability still played a larger role in lifting children out of poverty than government spending did.

by Alexander Adams

��

In a world marred by clickbait media headlines portending disaster, it’s always a relief when some rosy news can sneak its way into a major publication: “” was the title of a recent New York Times newsletter. Fortunately, there happens to be strong backing for such a direct headline: According to a by the firm Child Trends, a nonpartisan research center, in 1991 27.9% of children lived at or below the Census’. Today, that number has fallen to 11.4%.��

This is undoubtedly fantastic news. The research is: children living in poverty face worse lifetime outcomes on a whole host of measures. Childhood poverty leads to worse educational attainment, worse future labor market outcomes, worse mental and physical health and development, and increased risk of engaging in delinquent behavior. The reduction in child poverty makes the lives of millions of children better off and has positive externalities for everyone in the country.����

The Child Trends report asked a few fundamental questions regarding this amazing decline in child poverty, the key one being: what exactly caused this massive decline in child poverty?

According to the media’s portrayal of the report, the reduction was due to expanded social safety net and increased social safety net spending. Another New York Times on the Child Trends report was headlined: “Expanded Safety Net Drives Sharp Drop in Child Poverty.” Opinion writers at the Washington Post took it a , arguing that the decline in child poverty since the 1990s debunks “arguments that…government help must be accompanied with work requirements.”����

But does it really?�� �� ��

According to the Child Trends report itself, many of the programs proven to be successful in reducing poverty—the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), the Child Tax Credit, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (food stamps)—have work requirements. The EITC is actually an earnings supplement which has been shown to. The expansion of work requirements for welfare programs in the 1990s increased labor force participation, according to research, which translated into more income and less poverty.��

In 1991 27.9% of children lived at or below the Census’. Today, that number has fallen to 11.4%.��

In 1991 27.9% of children lived at or below the Census’. Today, that number has fallen to 11.4%.��

The increased post-tax income due to work incentives and requirements has not only reduced poverty and increased income, but has had nonfinancial impacts as well such as for children. The Ģ����Ƶ Center for Opportunity has previously published work on the deleterious nonfinancial impacts of nonwork. of the Child Trends report also shows that child poverty was stagnant from the beginning of the War on Poverty to the mid-1990s. The decline in child poverty occurred after we replaced our no strings attached welfare system with a system replete with pro-work incentives and requirements (though, work remains to be done).��

Given all of this, it should be argued, based on the results of the report, that it was pro-work reforms and expansions to earnings supplement programs which directly promote work and self-sustainability that reduce child poverty — not unrestricted government spending.

Not only that, but according to the Child Trends report itself, the vast majority of the decline in child poverty is attributable to increases in earned income and not expanded social safety net programs. According to the report, child poverty fell 16.5 percentage points — from 27.9% to 11.4% — between 1993 and 2019. In 2019, they argue the child poverty rate would be 44% higher in the absence of social safety net expansions. This means, of that 16.5% drop, approximately 6% can be attributed to social safety net spending and over 10% is due to non-governmental factors.[1]��

These other factors represent the effect of earned post-tax income not provided by aid. While the social safety net played a role in material child poverty reduction, we can see that private income played an even larger role in that decline.��

At GCO, we promote self-sustainability and work precisely because we understand that work plays a larger role in lifting oneself up from poverty than government aid — and the Child Trends report supports that argument.

The key takeaway from the Census data which shows child poverty rates are falling and the Child Trends report which studied the causes of the decline is that, despite massive social safety net expansions, work and self-sustainability still played a larger role in lifting children out of poverty than government spending did. Further, among the programs which did measurably help the poor, it was policies oriented towards promoting work, not programs without work requirements, which usually had the largest impact.

[1] As the child poverty rate in 2019 was 11.4% in 2019, and it would be 44% higher without social safety net expansions, this means, without social safety net expansions, child poverty would be approximately 16.4% (11.4*1.44 = 16.4). 16.4 (no welfare) minus 11.4 (reality) = 6%. This means approximately 10.5 percentage points of the 16.5% decline in child poverty was due to increases in earned income, and only 6 percentage points due to social safety nets (16.5 – 10.5 = 6).��

The post Key Policy Takeaways from 30 years of Child Poverty Decline appeared first on For Opportunity.

Part 1

By Erik Randolph

If you want to know how well welfare programs work, ask welfare agency administrators how they measure success. This was suggested by Randy Hicks, President and CEO of the Ģ����Ƶ Center for Opportunity (GCO), years ago. Almost invariably these administrators will answer that they measure success by how many people they serve. When the total number of people they serve goes up, the programs are more successful. Or are they?

To the contrary, program participation does not measure success. Furthermore, the chances are that welfare agency administrators lack the metrics to tell us how successful the programs truly are.

Program participation can measure demand for the program, or it might indicate the number of people in need. In these cases, program participation is useful information. But does it actually measure success?��

The more important goal of welfare programs is to help people overcome their financial difficulties and escape poverty. This enables them to live more fulfilling lives. Public policy should not encourage them to languish on assistance for years on end but rather help them improve their circumstances until they no longer need assistance, or their reliance on assistance becomes lessened. Welfare agencies generally lack metrics to effectively measure this important goal.

Which revises our original question slightly: How can you measure success?

Dependency Metrics

One potential way to measure success is to use dependency metrics that evaluate the percent of the population who are dependent on major welfare programs. This is partially done at the federal level but not at all at the state level.

In 1994, Congress passed the . It focuses on food stamps, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) cash grants, and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Every year, the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services is required to file a report with Congress showing dependency on those three welfare programs.

The most recent was released in 2018. The pie chart below comes from page eight of that report, showing for the year 2015 the percentages of the national population according to their proportion of their total income dependent on the value of food stamps, TANF cash grants, and SSI.��The higher the proportion of an individual’s income that comes from these three assistance programs, the worse off the person probably is. For example, if the value of food stamps constitutes more than 50 percent of an individual’s income, that person cannot be well off financially. In comparison, when food stamps constitute 25 percent to 50 percent of an individual’s income, it means the person has more additional income and is better off than when food stamps comprise more than 50 percent�� of total income. And having less than 25 percent of total income coming from food stamps is better than having 25 percent to 50 percent of total income on food stamps.

Ģ����Ƶ has the ability to generate dependency metrics through the Ģ����Ƶ Gateway, including TANF cash grants, food stamps, medical assistance, and two other programs. These are means-tested programs, meaning the Department of Human Services has not only participation numbers but also income information of the applicants and recipients. The Department could relatively easily have its I.T. crew write scripts to spit out reports periodically showing the number of individuals and families by dependency on their income on those programs captured through the Gateway. Coupled with Census data, the Department could produce periodic reports showing how dependency changes over time and further break down the data by demographic groups.��

Furthermore, because every individual has a unique identifier, the I.T. crew could produce additional scripts to follow people over time. This would allow for more sophisticated analytics showing the financial progress of people and families in the system.��

Dependency metrics are not perfect. They do not capture persons who would be eligible for the program but do not participate. However, the number of these individuals are regularly estimated and could be presented as additional information in the analysis.��

Ideally, it would be best if the dependency metrics captured all assistance programs. Currently, this is not possible.

Exactly How Many Programs Do People Benefit From?��

Often people qualify for multiple assistance programs. Their children might be on Medicaid and receiving free school lunches. At the same time, the household may be receiving food stamps. Additionally, if the parent or parents work, they may be receiving the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and Additional Child Tax Credit. We just listed five programs that welfare families typically receive.��

And there are more programs. If the family has young children under five, they could receive food packages from the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program. Additionally, the family may be receiving childcare assistance, Section 8 rental assistance, and/or energy assistance.

Now you might think that we have a dataset somewhere telling us the total number of welfare programs families are benefiting from. If you assumed that we do, you would be wrong. No such dataset exists.

The reason? First, the welfare system is disjointed. There is no single agency or dataset that can tell us the total number of programs people are on. Even Ģ����Ƶ’s award winning Gateway, which is one of the better integrated eligibility systems in the country, cannot tell you. While the Gateway can tell us about food stamps, Medicaid, WIC, TANF, and subsidized childcare services, it is missing the refundable tax credits, free school lunches breakfasts, Section 8 rental assistance, and other welfare programs not listed.��

Second, statistical sources do not include all welfare programs in their questionnaires and have other limitations, such as serious time lags. For example, the American Community Survey asks about food stamps, Medicaid, and Supplemental Security Income but practically none of the other programs, making a statistical inference for the complete picture impossible.��

The Survey of Income and Program Participation gets us closer, giving us childcare assistance, WIC, energy assistance, and public housing, among others. However, it is still missing the refundable tax credits, including the EITC which is one of the big three welfare programs. Worse, SIPP is structured for longitudinal studies that makes the survey totally impractical for monitoring program participation on a regular and timely basis.

Adopting Dependency Metrics in Ģ����Ƶ

Dependency metrics would improve our ability to measure success, and state leaders should consider implementing them in Ģ����Ƶ.��

Ģ����Ƶ would do a better job than the federal government with dependency metrics. The Gateway houses the data for critical programs, enabling Ģ����Ƶ to produce monthly estimates, more timely estimates, and for more programs. In contrast, the Feds apparently cannot meet its obligation in producing annual reports, provides only national data for only three programs, and there are significant time lags. The most recent Federal report came out on May 4, 2018, with 2015 and some 2016 data.

Once implemented at the state level, dependency metrics will improve over time. If and when further integration, consolidation, and streamlining of eligibility systems occur, as recommended by GCO, dependency metrics will become more complete and more useful.

However, they are not the sole answer. There is another way to measure success that would complement well dependency metrics. This will be the topic of my next blog.

In the meantime, do you have ideas on how we can measure success in welfare programs? We would love to hear them. Be sure to put them down in the comments below.

Erik Randolph is Director of Research at the Ģ����Ƶ Center for Opportunity. This blog reflects his opinion and not necessarily that of the Ģ����Ƶ Center for Opportunity.

DISINCENTIVES FOR WORK AND MARRIAGE IN GEORGIA’S WELFARE SYSTEM

Based on the most recent 2015 data, this report provides an in-depth look at the welfare cliffs across the state of Ģ����Ƶ. A computer model was created to demonstrate how welfare programs, alone or in combination with other programs, create multiple welfare cliffs for recipients that punish work. In addition to covering a dozen programs – more than any previous model – the tool used to produce the following report allows users to see how the welfare cliff affects individuals and families with very specific characteristics, including the age and sex of the parent, number of children, age of children, income, and other variables. Welfare reform conversations often lack a complete understanding of just how means-tested programs actually inflict harm on some of the neediest within our state’s communities.

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The post How Can You Measure Welfare Program Success? Part 1 appeared first on For Opportunity.

By Erik Randolph

When someone needs financial help or workforce training from the government, where do they go?

If we just allowed people to navigate federal programs on their own, the average person would be completely overwhelmed.

According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, there are more than and at the federal level, with little overlap. Just listing the programs would exceed the word limit for a typical blog.��

Fortunately, states have some control over the process for some of the larger programs, like food stamps and Medicaid, that serve millions of Americans.

Ģ����Ƶ’s Gateway Strategy

Compared to many states, Ģ����Ƶ is ahead. The state government has spent years and $262 million to streamline its eligibility systems of means-tested programs into an integrated system known as the .

Here there is just one “door” to enter to qualify for some of the big federal means-tested programs entrusted to the states to administer.

The Gateway allows individuals to apply for ten programs across four state agencies, including�� food stamps; food packages from the Women, Infants, and Children Program; Medicaid; subsidized childcare; and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.

The Department of Human Services runs the eligibility system at an annual operating cost of about $62 million, but the department does not administer all the programs themselves. For example, the Department of Community Health administers the Medicaid program, and the Department of Early Care and Learning administers the subsidized childcare program.��

Integrated eligibility systems are far more convenient for the customers, requiring them to enter only one door, instead of up to five separate doors in the case of Ģ����Ƶ. It also streamlines the application process for the customer.��

On the administrative side, all the hard work is done behind the scenes. The automated systems can share information between programs. Moreover, the technology sets up the state to accomplish future streamlining, consolidation, and reform.

Despite all these advantages of the Gateway, there is still room for improvement. Take Utah’s system, for example.��

Utah’s Integrated System

Although Ģ����Ƶ is ahead of many states, Utah may be the furthest ahead.��

As explained in a recent American Enterprise Institute , Utah streamlined 23 workforce programs across six state agencies into a Department of Workforce Services.

In addition to helping customers with employment, Utah treats basic welfare programs as . These include food stamps, subsidized childcare, financial assistance, and medical programs. Customers also can file .��

The Utah system is clean and easy for the customer. Its “no wrong door” policy allows easy access to help in finding employment and receiving support services. It also sends a clear message that Utah prioritizes work as a solution.

Behind the scenes, Utah works with various federal agencies to make the system work. It is not an easy task. It requires creative solutions and continual effort on part of the state to take on the many hassles that come with dealing with the federal government, including the burdensome task of securing “waiver” approvals to federal law from the federal agencies.

However, the goal is worthwhile. It creates an easier experience for the customers,�� at�� overall less administrative cost.

Much More Work Needs to Be Done

Utah is showing the way, but much more work needs to be done.��

There are still welfare benefits that the federal government does not allow states to administer. These program benefits are additional doors that people must enter, requiring additional effort to apply for those benefits and hoops to jump through to get assistance.��

In other words, while Ģ����Ƶ has integrated eligibility systems, and Utah has gone even further with its integration, there are federal government programs outside the control of the states. These include the Earned Income Tax Credit, the Supplemental Security Income, and public housing.

Furthermore, as we have written about, the rules themselves still need fixing to eliminate welfare cliffs and marriage penalties.��

Nevertheless, progress is being made, and the work continues on.��

Do you have experience with the Ģ����Ƶ Gateway and other assistance programs?�� Or perhaps experience in another state? Share your experiences in the comments below.
Erik Randolph is Director of Research at the Ģ����Ƶ Center for Opportunity. This blog reflects his opinion and not necessarily that of the Ģ����Ƶ Center for Opportunity.

List of Programs per the Government Accountability Office, Reports and

• 21st Century Community Learning Centers
• Additional Child Tax Credit
• Adoption Assistance
• Adult Education Grants to States (Adult Education and Family Literacy Act)
• Affordable Care Act Maternal, Infant, and Early Childhood Home Visiting Program
• American Indian Vocational Rehabilitation Services
• Career and Technical Education – Basic Grants to States
• Chafee Foster Care Independence Program
• Child and Adult Care Food Program (lower-income components)
• Child Care and Development Fund
• Child Support Enforcement
• Choice Neighborhoods Implementation Grants
• Commodity Supplemental Food Program
• Community Based Job Training Grants
• Community Development Block Grants
• Community Service Employment for Older Americans
• Community Services Block Grant
• Compensated Work Therapy
• Consolidated Health Centers
• Disabled Veterans’ Outreach Program
• Earned Income Tax Credit
• Education for the Disadvantaged- Grants to Local Educational Agencies (Title I, Part A)
• Emergency Food and Shelter Program
• Environmental Workforce Development and Job Training Cooperative Agreements (Brownfield Job Training Cooperative Agreements in 2011report)
• Exclusion of Cash Public Assistance Benefits
• Family Planning
• Federal Pell Grants
• Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants
• Federal TRIO Programs
• Federal Work-Study
• Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations
• Foster Care
• Foster Grandparent Program
• Fresh Fruits and Vegetables Program
• Gaining Early Awareness and Readiness for Undergraduate Programs
• Grants to States for Workplace and Community Transition Training for Incarcerated Individuals
• H-1B Job Training Grants
• Head Start
• Higher Education: Aid for Institutional Development programs and Developing Hispanic-Serving Institutions programs
• HOME Investment Partnerships Program
• Homeless Veterans’ Reintegration Program (Homeless Veterans’ Reintegration Project in 2011 report)
• Homeless Assistance Grants
• Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS
• Improving Teacher Quality State Grants
• Indian and Native American Program (Native American Employment and Training in 2011 report)
• Indian Education – Bureau of Indian Education

• Indian Education—Formula Grants to Local Educational Agencies
• Indian Health Service
• Indian Housing Block Grant
• Indian Human Services (Division of Human Services)
• Job Corps
• Job Placement and Training Program (Indian Employment Assistance in 2011 report)
• Job Training, Employment Skills Training, Apprenticeships, and Internships
• Legal Services Corporation
• Local Veterans’ Employment Representative Program
• Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program
• Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
• Maternal and Child Health Block Grant
• Mathematics and Science Partnerships
• d settings.
• Medicaid
• Medical Care for Low- Income Veterans Without Service-Connected Disability
• Migrant and Seasonal Farmworker Program
• National Breast and Cervical Cancer Early Detection Program
• National Farmworker Jobs Program
• National School Lunch Program (free and reduced- price components)
• Native American Career and Technical Education Program (Career and Technical Education – Indian Set-Aside in 2011 report)
• Native Employment Works (Tribal Work Grants in 2011)
• Native Hawaiian Career and Technical Education Program
• Nutrition Assistance Program for Puerto Rico
• Nutrition Service for the Elderly
• Older Americans Act Grants for Supportive Services and Senior Centers
• Older Americans Act: National Family Caregiver Support Program
• Projects with Industry
• Public Housing
• Reentry Employment Opportunities (Reintegration of Ex-Offenders in 2011 report)
• Refugee and Entrant Assistance – Discretionary Grants (Refugee and Entrant Assistance – Targeted Assistance Discretionary Program from 2011 is now part of this program)
• Refugee and Entrant Assistance – Targeted Assistance Grants
• Refugee and Entrant Assistance – Voluntary Agencies Matching Grant Program
• Refugee and Entrant Assistance State/Replacement Designee Administered Programs ((Refugee and Entrant Assistance – Social Services Program from 2011 is now part of this program)
• Registered Apprenticeship
• Rental Housing Bonds Interest Exclusion
• Rural Education Achievement Program
• Rural Rental Assistance Payments
• Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program
• School Breakfast Program (free and reduced-price components)

• ��Second Chance Act Technology-Based Career Training Program for Incarcerated Adults and Juveniles (Second Chance Act Reentry Initiative in 2011 report)
• Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers
• Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance
• Senior Community Service Employment Program
• Social Services and Targeted Assistance for Refugees
• Social Services Block Grants
• Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC)
• State Children’s Health Insurance Program
• State Supported Employment Services Program
• State Vocational Rehabilitation Services Program (Rehabilitation Services – Vocational Rehabilitation Grants to States in 2011 report)
• Summer Food Service Program
• Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
• Supplemental Security Income
• Supportive Housing for Persons with Disabilities
• Supportive Housing for the Elderly
• Tech Prep Education State Grants
• Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
• The Emergency Food Assistance Program
• Title I Migrant Education Program
• Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers
• Transition Assistance Program
• Transitional Cash and Medical Services to Refugees
• Tribal Technical Colleges (United Tribes Technical College in 2011 report)
• Tribally Controlled Postsecondary Career and Technical Institutions
• Veterans Pension and Survivors Pension
• Veterans’ Workforce Investment Program
• Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Vocational Rehabilitation for Disabled Veterans in 2011 report)
• Voluntary Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit- Low-Income Subsidy
• Wagner-Peyser Act Employment Service (Employment Service/Wagner-Peyser Funded Activities in 2011 report)
• Water and Waste Disposal Systems for Rural Communities
• Weatherization Assistance
• Work Opportunity Tax Credit
• Workforce Investment Act Adult Activitiesa
• Workforce Investment Act Youth Activitiesb
• WIOA National Dislocated Worker Grants (WIA National Emergency Grants in 2011)
• WIOA Youth Program (WIA Youth Activities in 2011 report)
• Women in Apprenticeship and Nontraditional Occupations
• Youth Partnership Programs (Conservation Activities by Youth Service Organizations in 2011 report)
• YouthBuild

DISINCENTIVES FOR WORK AND MARRIAGE IN GEORGIA’S WELFARE SYSTEM

Based on the most recent 2015 data, this report provides an in-depth look at the welfare cliffs across the state of Ģ����Ƶ. A computer model was created to demonstrate how welfare programs, alone or in combination with other programs, create multiple welfare cliffs for recipients that punish work. In addition to covering a dozen programs – more than any previous model – the tool used to produce the following report allows users to see how the welfare cliff affects individuals and families with very specific characteristics, including the age and sex of the parent, number of children, age of children, income, and other variables. Welfare reform conversations often lack a complete understanding of just how means-tested programs actually inflict harm on some of the neediest within our state’s communities.

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The post The Best Administrative Structure for Welfare appeared first on For Opportunity.

Computational model exposes severe problems with the welfare system

Pop quiz: When does $9 + $1 equal –$6,000?

This may look like new math, but it is not.

This seemingly nonsensical equation illustrates the challenges faced by families who receive assistance from means-tested welfare programs.

In fact, these exact numbers come from a computer model I designed, which was sponsored by the Ģ����Ƶ Center for Opportunity. It evaluates financial incentives, or more precisely, disincentives embedded in our nation’s welfare system.

This computer modeling examined the potential case of a single mom with two children in Gwinnett County, Ģ����Ƶ. Using 2015 data, if she were offered the opportunity to earn $10 per hour instead of earning $9 per hour, she would lose nearly $6,000 in welfare benefits within a year’s time.

The reason for the loss is not due to her earned income. By increasing her earnings from $9 per hour to $10, she nets an additional $1,820 a year. The reason for the loss has to do with the way the welfare system is designed, or more accurately, the way it has been haphazardly put together over the past fifty years. At $9 per hour, the single mom would be eligible for the following means-tested programs:

the earned income tax credit ($5,419),

additional child tax credit ($2,000),

food stamps ($2,772),

free or reduced-cost school meals ($502),

WIC food packages ($480),

Section 8 housing choice voucher ($9,805),

subsidized childcare ($8,918), and

Medicaid ($4,570).

When added together, this single mom has a benefits package—courtesy of the taxpayers—estimated at $34,467. So instead of bringing home $17,266, her estimated income is actually $51,733 after government subsidies are included. To state it differently, for every $1 she earns in net income, she is eligible for nearly $2 in welfare benefits.

Now consider the case if she would earn $10 per hour. She would still receive means-tested benefits, but the benefit amounts will change as follows:

earned income tax credit ($4,977),

additional child tax credit ($2,000),

food stamps ($2,352),

free or reduced-cost school meals ($502),

WIC food packages ($480),

subsidized childcare ($8,658),

Medicaid ($4,570), and

Affordable Care Act credits and subsidies ($3,152).

In summary, her benefits drop to an estimated value of $28,938. When combined with her take-home pay, she is worse off by nearly $6,000 from earning $10 per hour than earning $9 per hour.

What this example demonstrates is the infamous welfare cliff, that unintended consequence of the current welfare system whereby an individual or family loses by earning more.

Unfortunately, this example is not an isolated incident. It represents what’s happening everywhere.

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